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HALLIBURTON AND THE DOG 
THAT DIDN’T BARK 
ANN M. LIPTON* 
ABSTRACT 
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that defendants in a Section 10(b) class action may use the class-
certification process to rebut the “fraud on the market” presumption 
that their misstatements impacted the price of the relevant security. In so 
doing, the Court struggled to explain why the class-certification 
process—rather than trial on the merits—was the proper venue for such 
disputes, and avoided the most obvious justification, namely, that in the 
absence of price impact, plaintiffs would still be able to bring individual 
claims. The Court’s unwillingness to hold that plaintiffs may bring 
“eyeball” reliance claims even without demonstrating price impact 
suggests that the Court has doubts that such claims are viable. 
If so, the Court misinterpreted the fraud on the market theory and 
the distinction between claims based on individual evaluation of 
corporate-specific information and claims based on reliance on the 
market price. The Court’s holding could therefore unfairly impact 
future claims based on individual reliance. Moreover, the Court’s 
willingness to front-load disputes into the class-certification stage—
without offering a clear justification for doing so—demonstrates that 
Halliburton was ultimately an exercise in line drawing, representing a 
compromise position likely motivated by a desire to protect defendants 
from litigation risks. 
INTRODUCTION 
The fraud on the market doctrine is a legal presumption that 
public misrepresentations regarding a security that trades in an “open 
and developed” market distort the security’s price.1 Investors who 
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 1.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988). 
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purchase the security may then be said to have “relied” on the 
misstatement (by paying the manipulated price), allowing them to 
satisfy the reliance element of a fraud claim brought under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and facilitating the 
aggregation of their claims in a class action.2 In Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),3 the Supreme Court 
clarified that when plaintiffs seek to certify a class utilizing the fraud 
on the market doctrine, defendants may offer rebuttal evidence to 
challenge the presumption of price distortion as part of the 
certification inquiry. In so doing, the Court struggled to explain why 
these disputes should be resolved in the context of Rule 23.4 The 
Court’s difficulty with this point suggests it intended something else 
entirely: that when defendants make fraudulent representations 
concerning a security that trades in an open and developed market, 
investors who purchase the security at the market price may only use 
the fraud on the market doctrine to satisfy the element of reliance 
when bringing a claim under Section 10(b); they may not argue in the 
alternative that they personally heard, and actually relied upon, the 
misstatement. If this is what the Court meant, it represents a new—
and incorrect—interpretation of the fraud on the market theory, 
which could unduly restrict a broad swath of individual actions. 
II.  THE ROAD SO FAR 
Private plaintiffs may use Section 10(b) to bring claims for fraud 
in connection with securities transactions. As is the case with most 
fraud claims, to prevail, plaintiffs must show that they “relied” upon a 
false statement. In one-to-one transactions, such as private sales, 
investors receive information supplied directly from the fraudster, 
allowing them to identify easily what information they received and 
the role it played in their investment decision. But when an investor 
purchases a security in an open-market transaction, “reliance” may be 
a complicated proposition. Information about publicly traded 
securities is usually distributed via press releases, SEC filings, 
conference calls with analysts, and so forth. The same or similar 
information is often re-publicized multiple times—such as false 
earnings reports that appear in different company press releases and 
are repeated in successive quarterly reports—before the truth is 
 
 2.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2015). 
 3.  134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 4.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth the standards for class certification). 
LIPTON 11.6.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  2:57 PM 
2015] HALLIBURTON AND THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK 3 
revealed and investors suffer losses. Investors may rely directly upon 
any of the documents in which the information appears, but they also 
make decisions based on information obtained through a variety of 
intermediaries—stock brokers, analysts, news articles, 
recommendations by friends or relatives—all of which may, in turn, 
incorporate information gleaned from a variety of other sources. 
Additionally, investor reliance on these sources of information may 
increase demand for a security, causing its price to rise, thus affecting 
more investors who purchase at the manipulated price. This entire 
ecosystem of investors and information intermediaries constitutes 
“the market,” such that a misstatement actually relied upon by a small 
segment of the market may ultimately have an impact far beyond its 
initial audience.5 
Recognizing these dynamics, courts developed the “fraud on the 
market” doctrine for use in Section 10(b) actions, which the Supreme 
Court endorsed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.6 As articulated by the Basic 
majority, the doctrine consists of two rebuttable presumptions that 
favor Section 10(b) plaintiffs: first, that in an open and developed 
market, public, material information about a security will influence its 
price, and second, that investors who purchase at the market price are, 
in some sense, subjectively “relying” on that price to communicate 
information about the security’s value.7 “Material” information, 
according to the Basic Court, means information that “would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the total mix of information made available.”8 
Put together, then, the fraud on the market presumptions allow an 
open-market purchaser to establish that he or she “relied,” indirectly, 
on a defendant’s fraud, if the purchaser can demonstrate that the 
fraudulent information was material. Even if the plaintiff cannot 
prove that she personally heard the defendant’s statements or took 
them into account when making an investment decision, the plaintiff 
may nonetheless establish “indirect” reliance by taking advantage of 
the presumptions to show that she purchased the security at a market 
price that was distorted by fraud. Defendants are entitled to try to 
 
 5.  Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 895, 901–02 (2013). 
 6.  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 7.  See id. at 247. 
 8.  Id. at 231–32. 
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rebut these presumptions, but if they fail to do so, the plaintiff will 
prevail on the reliance element of her claims. 
The fraud on the market doctrine has been employed to establish 
reliance in lawsuits brought by individual investors,9 but it has 
attracted extensive judicial and scholarly attention because of its role 
in facilitating class-action claims. Not only does the doctrine make it 
easier for a plaintiff to establish reliance, but it also allows all plaintiffs 
who purchase a given security to establish reliance by common 
evidence. Courts entertaining Section 10(b) claims need not conduct 
individualized inquiries into the types of information upon which 
particular investors relied; the fraud on the market doctrine allows 
that question to be resolved for all investors in one fell swoop. As a 
result, the doctrine removes the main stumbling block to class 
certification for Section 10(b) claims concerning publicly traded 
securities. Most classes may only be certified if the plaintiffs 
demonstrate that questions “common” to the class predominate over 
questions that raise individualized issues;10 the fraud on the market 
doctrine replaces individualized questions of reliance with a common 
question regarding the characteristics of the market in which the 
security traded. 
However, the fraud on the market doctrine is not without its 
difficulties, starting with the slipperiness of the concept of an “open 
and well developed” market. The Basic Court never defined the 
phrase, and though it is generally understood that such a market 
involves a high volume of secondary trading and relative price 
transparency,11 that only begs the question of how active, how liquid, 
the market must be to justify a presumption that false information has 
impacted a security’s price. The essential difficulty is that no market 
perfectly absorbs information the moment at which it is disseminated. 
Complex information may be difficult for analysts to digest; 
information disclosed in an obscure location may not be immediately 
noticed. The more high-profile and widely traded a security, the more 
likely it is that new information will be rapidly assimilated, but there 
are no bright line rules for determining how quickly a particular type 
of information will impact prices in various types of markets.12 
 
 9.  Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 10.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 11.  See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 12.  Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 151 WIS. L. 
REV. 151, 170 (2009); James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: 
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Thus, after Basic, courts faced two conundrums: how open and 
developed must a market be before the fraud on the market doctrine 
is deemed to apply? And if such an open and developed market exists, 
how “public” and easily digestible must the information be before it is 
presumed to have an impact? These are related questions—the more 
developed the market, the more likely it is that obscure information 
will influence stock prices—but the fraud on the market doctrine does 
not allow courts to (explicitly) adopt a sliding scale based on the 
interaction of market characteristics and statement prominence. As a 
result, courts answered the questions with, respectively, “very,” and (at 
least in some cases) “minimally.” 
For the types of markets subject to the fraud on the market 
doctrine, courts have adopted a very demanding standard of 
“efficiency.”13 Plaintiffs must show the security trades in a market that 
rapidly and fully adjusts to all public, material information.14 This is an 
extraordinarily high bar that often excludes, for example, stocks of 
smaller companies,15 newly issued stock,16 and securities other than 
common stock.17 
At the same time, courts often presume that even “fine print” and 
generic disclosures influence prices, such as a representation that the 
company is in compliance with the law.18 This is a mixed blessing for 
plaintiffs: on the one hand, it means that even obscure statements 
buried in lengthy SEC filings can form the basis of a fraud claim, but 
on the other hand, it allows defendants to argue that whatever false 
information they shouted from the rooftops, a tiny, offsetting 
disclosure was sufficient to inform the market of the truth, thus 
negating any price impact caused by the initial false statement.19 
 
Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1732 (2013). 
 13.  Langevoort, supra note 12, at 173; James D. Cox, Fraud On The Market After Amgen, 
9 DUKE J. CONST.  L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2013). 
 14.  In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 15.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal 
Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. 
L. REV. 303, 322 (2002); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474–78 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
 16.  In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 17.  Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 210 
(2d Cir. 2008); Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., No. 13-CV-23878-UU, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 136684 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014). 
 18.  Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 19.  Courts have taken a wide variety of approaches to arguments that truthful information 
has mitigated false information. Some require that the offsetting information be “transmitted to 
the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbalance any 
misleading impression” left by the original false statement. Nguyen v. Radient Pharm. Corp., 
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“Either the market is efficient or it is not. A plaintiff in the Investors’ 
situation must take the bitter with the sweet,” as the Eleventh Circuit 
put it.20 
This “truth on the market” corollary to the fraud on the market 
doctrine grows directly out of Basic. There, the Court explained that 
the presumption of price distortion might be effectively rebutted if, 
for example, “the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth . . . and thus 
[]  the market price would not have been affected by [defendants’] 
misrepresentations.”21 In other words, Basic entertained the possibility 
that an offsetting “truth” about a defendant’s fraud might be known 
only to a segment of the market, but that this knowledge would be 
sufficient to maintain prices at their proper, un-manipulated levels, 
even if some individual traders remained fooled.22 Other courts, by 
allowing even obscure and scattered bits of nominally public 
information to defeat the fraud on the market presumption, implicitly 
seem to agree.23 Thus, per Basic, plaintiffs are entitled to an initial 
 
No. SA-CV-11-0406-DOC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122533 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011). Others are 
willing to presume that even piecemeal or obscure disclosures offset much more prominent false 
statements. See, e.g., Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013); Asher v. Baxter 
Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 20.  Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1199. 
 21.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988). 
 22.  The traditional view in finance has been that “noise” traders—uninformed investors, 
those most likely to be fooled by corporate misstatements—contribute little to a stock’s price, 
and that most pricing is due to the trades of sophisticated investors who are harder to mislead. 
See John M. Newman, Jr. et al., Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory for Evaluating the “Misleading” and “Materiality” Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 
20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 571, 574 (1995). This traditional view, however, has been challenged by 
other studies that demonstrate the influence of “noise” traders. See, e.g., Claire Hill, Why 
Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other 
Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997). 
 23.  Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1197; In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005). To 
be sure, the line between the materiality concept as a general category, and the truth on the 
market concept as subset of that category, is a fuzzy one. Materiality is gauged in light of the 
“total mix of information made available.” Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. Truth on the market is also a 
claim that the total mix of information prevented the false information from having an impact 
on price. Thus, on first blush, the two may appear to be coextensive. Nonetheless, at least in 
theory, truth on the market remains a distinct subset of the materiality analysis, because it 
depends on the aggregated trading behavior of the market as a whole, rather than the effect of 
the misrepresentation on a hypothetical investor.  The difference becomes plain when one 
considers that materiality is gauged from the point of view of the “reasonable investor,” who 
typically is interpreted to mean a typical retail investor. Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: 
Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 155 
(2010).  Retail investors are not necessarily charged with understanding, or even being aware of, 
all information made public; an offsetting “truth” might be “available” in nominally public 
fashion to sophisticated investors without being available to, or comprehensible by, retail 
investors.  Markets may even theoretically incorporate privately held “truths,” as Basic seems to 
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presumption that public, material false information distorts stock 
prices but—also per Basic—defendants are entitled to rebut that 
presumption by, among other things, demonstrating that the truth was 
“known” to some, though not necessarily all, persons. 
Plaintiffs and defendants invariably lock horns over the types of 
statements, and markets, that justify the presumption of price impact, 
but they also dispute when courts should make determinations about 
these issues. In general, they agree that plaintiffs should have the 
burden of establishing that a market is open and developed at the 
class-certification stage (though disputes continue over the definition 
of “open and developed” and what evidence is required to establish 
its presence). But here the agreement ends: plaintiffs and defendants 
have continually relitigated the extent to which the specific issue of 
price distortion—whether it occurred at all and at what point the 
price was restored to its “correct” level—may be decided at the class-
certification stage. Defendants have generally argued that, as with 
market efficiency, absent price impact there can be no class-wide 
determination of reliance; therefore, the question is ripe for resolution 
as part of the class-certification process. Plaintiffs, by contrast, insist 
that once market efficiency is established, any remaining questions 
should be decided by the factfinder at summary judgment or trial. 
III.  THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM? 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the proper 
scope of the fraud on the market class-certification inquiry on three 
separate occasions, the latter two of which are relevant here.24 In 
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,25 the Court considered 
 
contemplate. Thus, when courts entertain securities claims that are not predicated on fraud on 
the market, plaintiffs may satisfy the element of “materiality” even when offsetting information 
was generally available, because, depending on the context, courts may refuse to charge 
plaintiffs with knowledge of extraneous source material. See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Health Fund 
v. Royal Bank of Scot. Group, PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); United Paperworkers Int’l 
Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993); Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 
F.3d 207, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 
(1991) (holding, outside the fraud on the market context, that “not every mixture with the true 
will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the 
one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so”). 
 24.  The first time, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) 
(“Halliburton I”), the Court ended up avoiding the most significant disputes. See id. at 2187 n.* 
(“According to Halliburton, a plaintiff must prove price impact only after Basic’s presumption 
has been successfully rebutted by the defendant. We express no views on the merits of such a 
framework.”) (citation omitted). 
 25.  133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
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whether materiality is appropriate for resolution at the class-
certification stage. Materiality plays a dual role in Section 10(b) 
litigation: it is a required element of the plaintiff’s claim, and it is also 
a precondition for the presumption of price impact to apply. The 
Amgen defendants contended that because the presumption of price 
impact necessarily rests on the materiality of the alleged false 
statements, there could be no such presumption—and thus no 
commonality on the element of reliance—absent materiality. They 
therefore argued that plaintiffs should be required to prove 
materiality or, at the very least, defendants should be granted the 
opportunity to rebut materiality, as part of the Rule 23 inquiry.26 
The Court rejected the argument, reasoning that because 
materiality is a required element of any Section 10(b) claim, its lack 
would not create individualized issues. Absent materiality, there may 
be no price impact, but there is also no claim; the case will stand or 
fall for all plaintiffs, equally. Thus, materiality is not an element that 
distinguishes claims that can be resolved on a class-wide basis from 
claims that cannot, and it is therefore inappropriate for determination 
at the class-certification stage.27 
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of 
fraud on the market and class certification.  This time, the defendants 
were more direct in their challenge. They sought to have the Court 
overturn Basic v. Levinson entirely, in part on the ground that 
markets are too erratic to justify presuming that any particular 
statement affects securities prices.28 But, similar to the Amgen 
defendants, they argued in the alternative that, because the Basic 
presumption of price impact is rebuttable, defendants should be 
permitted to offer their rebuttal evidence at the class-certification 
stage.29 
The Court rejected the defendants’ frontal assault on Basic. 
Echoing a point made by a number of scholars,30 the Court held that 
markets need not be perfectly efficient to justify a presumption that 
 
 26.  See id. at 1191. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409–10. 
 29.  See id. at 2413. 
 30.  See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 12, at 171–72; Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, 
Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 456 (2006); Cox, 
supra note 12, at 1732. 
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false information generally affects prices.31 Instead, it described the 
Basic presumption of price impact as “modest,” resting only on the 
premise that “market professionals generally consider most publicly 
announced material statements about companies.”32 The Court’s 
holding on this point has led Donald Langevoort to speculate that 
going forward, courts may loosen their overly strict definitions of 
market efficiency.33 
After affirming Basic’s continued vitality, the Court accepted 
defendants’ fallback position that they should be permitted to rebut 
the presumption of price impact as a part of their challenge to class 
certification. In doing so, the Court had to distinguish Amgen and 
explain why rebuttal evidence concerning price impact was 
appropriate while rebuttal evidence concerning materiality was not. 
Happily, there is a natural explanation that flows from Amgen’s 
logic: Price impact, unlike materiality, is not a necessary element of a 
Section 10(b) claim. Price impact is simply one mechanism for 
proving the element of reliance. If defendants establish there has been 
no price impact, they have made it impossible for plaintiffs to 
establish reliance on a common basis, but there remains the possibility 
that some investors may have personally heard the false statements, 
and can establish reliance in the traditional manner. Thus, a lack of 
price impact creates individualized issues. This is different from 
materiality because a lack of materiality destroys all plaintiffs’ claims 
across the board. 
That is what one would have expected the Court to hold. But at 
this point, Halliburton II took a surprising turn. Because even though 
the above explanation is simple, readily available, and congruent with 
Amgen, it is not the explanation that the Court offered. Instead, the 
Court wrote: 
The fact that a misrepresentation was reflected in the market price 
at the time of the transaction . . . is Basic’s fundamental premise. . . . 
That is why, if reliance is to be shown through the Basic 
presumption, the publicity and market efficiency prerequisites 
must be proved before class certification. Without proof of those 
 
 31.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410. 
 32.  Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 n. 24). 
 33.  Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen 
and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L., REV. 37, 53 (2015) (expressing hope that 
“Halliburton II will take the steam out of” efforts by defendants to convince courts that markets 
must be “hyper” efficient to justify application of the doctrine). 
LIPTON 11.6.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  2:57 PM 
10 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 10:2 
prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market theory underlying the 
presumption completely collapses, rendering class certification 
inappropriate. 
But as explained, publicity and market efficiency are nothing more 
than prerequisites for an indirect showing of price impact. There is 
no dispute that at least such indirect proof of price impact is 
needed to ensure that the questions of law or fact common to the 
class will predominate. . . . 
Our choice in this case, then, is not between allowing price impact 
evidence at the class certification stage or relegating it to the 
merits. Evidence of price impact will be before the court at the 
certification stage in any event. The choice, rather, is between 
limiting the price impact inquiry before class certification to 
indirect evidence, or allowing consideration of direct evidence as 
well. As explained, we see no reason to artificially limit the inquiry 
at the certification stage to indirect evidence of price impact.34 
In this passage, the Court avoided the easiest argument, i.e., that 
the absence of price impact, unlike the absence of materiality, creates 
individualized issues. Instead, the Court made a procedural argument: 
because a trial court must, one way or another, consider evidence of 
price impact at class certification (by examining market efficiency and 
the publicity of the challenged statements), it should consider all the 
evidence available (except, apparently, evidence of materiality). The 
dog, one might say, did not bark.35 
Which leads to the question: why? 
The natural conclusion is that the Court doubts individual 
plaintiffs can bring actual reliance claims—”eyeball” reliance, as 
practitioners call it—based on false statements made in an open and 
developed market, at least not without also demonstrating price 
impact. That, in fact, is exactly what was argued by the Halliburton II 
plaintiff and the United States as amicus,36 a point which the Court 
obliquely appeared to accept: 
[W]e held [in Amgen] that [materiality] should be left to the merits 
stage, because it does not bear on the predominance requirement 
 
 34.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416–17 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). 
 35.  See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (citing A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE 
COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927)). 
 36.  See Brief for Respondent at 50, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 30, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) [hereinafter Brief for the 
United States]. 
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of Rule 23(b)(3). . . . We [] noted that a failure to prove materiality 
would necessarily defeat every plaintiff’s claim on the merits; . . . In 
this latter respect, we explained, materiality differs from the 
publicity and market efficiency prerequisites, neither of which is 
necessary to prove a Rule 10b-5 claim on the merits. 
[The plaintiff] argues that much of the foregoing could be said of 
price impact as well. Fair enough.37 
Indeed, the seeds of such a conclusion were sown in Amgen itself, 
because in Amgen, the defendants offered what was essentially a truth 
on the market defense to the plaintiffs’ allegations of materiality.38 A 
truth on the market defense allows for the possibility that some 
investors were fooled by the false statement, even though the false 
statement did not impact the security’s price. Yet the Amgen Court 
still held that all of the plaintiffs’ claims would fail if the defendants 
prevailed in their argument that “the market”—meaning the market 
price—reflected the truth.39 
If this is the correct interpretation of Halliburton II, it means 
fraud on the market is more than just an alternative mechanism for 
establishing reliance. It means fraud on the market is the only 
mechanism for establishing reliance, at least for securities that trade 
“efficiently.” 
IV.  BACK TO BASICS 
If the Halliburton II Court intended to imply that individual 
claims for reliance are not viable in the context of open-market 
frauds, it would be an intriguing throwback to the origins of the fraud 
 
 37.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (emphasis added). 
 38.  For example, they claimed that analysts who “scrutinized Amgen’s business” had not 
been fooled, see Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 8, Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. 
Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (No. 09.56965), (9th Cir. 2011), and pointed out that the truth could 
have been inferred by a diligent perusal of a particular announcement that the FDA had placed 
in the Federal Register, Brief for Petitioners at 50, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085). They did not, however, contend either that their 
misstatements were per se immaterial, or that countervailing information was widely available 
to investors generally. 
 39.  Significantly, a similar idea is built into the securities laws themselves. Section 18 of the 
Securities Exchange Act provides a private right of action based on false statements in SEC 
filings, but requires plaintiffs to demonstrate both actual reliance, and that the false statement 
impacted the market price, before they can bring a claim. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2015). 
Individual reliance, absent price impact, is not enough. This was, in fact, one of the arguments 
advanced by the defendants in Halliburton II, and Basic before that: to allow plaintiffs to allege 
reliance via fraud on the market would undermine the more restrictive requirements of Section 
18. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409. 
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on the market doctrine. In a 1982 article,40 Professor Daniel Fischel 
advocated replacing the traditional reliance inquiry with fraud on the 
market, and in his formulation—if the “market” itself was not 
“fooled”—no investor would have a claim, even if he or she actually 
relied on the false statement. As he put it, 
Suppose that an investor, after reading a false statement, believes 
that a particular investment offers a superior rate of return and 
invests accordingly. The market, however, ignores the false 
statement so that it has no effect on the market price. . . . If there 
has been no fraud on the market . . . investors have not been 
induced to invest by any fraudulent conduct of the defendant. The 
law has never compensated for injury where the so-called 
reasonable man—in this case the market—has not been misled. 
Such investors earned the market rate of return and are entitled to 
no more.41 
Thus, in Fischel’s view, an investor who purchased at an 
undistorted price could not have experienced any injury, because she 
would have received fair value for her investment. The market’s 
accurate valuation of the security would break any chain of causation 
between the original misstatement and the injury suffered by the 
investor.42 
Both the Halliburton II plaintiff, and the United States as amicus, 
advanced a similar argument. Each contended that in the absence of 
price impact, there could be no individual claims because no investor 
would be able to prove “loss causation.”43 Loss causation, an 
independent element of Section 10(b), requires the investor to show 
that the fraud caused her injuries. In open market frauds, this 
generally occurs when the truth is disclosed and the market adjusts to 
the new information by “correcting” the price of the stock. If the 
market is never misled, any subsequent drops in stock price cannot be 
attributed to corrections of the original false information, and 
investors cannot incur compensable losses. Or more simply, if the 
market price was undistorted, the investor by definition got what she 
paid for. 
 
 40.  Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982). 
 41.  See id. at 14–15. 
 42.  See id. at 15 (arguing that there can be no causal connection between the harm and the 
false statement “by definition” where “the market price was not affected”). 
 43.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 36, at 50; Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 
30. 
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Yet this narrow view of compensable losses overlooks the fact that 
the “market” price reflects the different judgments and expectations 
of heterogeneous investors regarding the relative weight to put on 
different types of information,44 and a multiplicity of judgments on 
this point may still be rational. To borrow Fischel’s terminology, the 
“market” is not a single reasonable man, but thousands of them. 
Investors who do not rely on any information at all—index investors, 
for example—may be said to have accepted the market’s judgment of 
value and, in the absence of price distortion, to have gotten precisely 
what they paid for.45 But investors who evaluate stock information 
individually form their own assessments of the value of publicly 
available information. Among other things, they may reach varying, 
but still rational, conclusions as to the likelihood of different 
outcomes, and they may weight information differently based on their 
own personal risk tolerances.  Some may be willing to tolerate a high-
risk investment with a high potential payoff; others may prefer a low-
risk investment with a low potential payoff. The two investments 
might have identical expected values (and thus identical stock prices), 
but investors with lower risk tolerances suffer a real harm when a 
stock turns out to be riskier than they expected, and prices drop as a 
result. 
Imagine, for example, a company has a new drug application 
pending before the FDA. If the drug is approved, the stock price will 
soar; if the drug is rejected, the company will be worthless. The 
“market” will value the stock at some formula representing the 
expected value of the future sales balanced against the risk of non-
approval. But this price masks a variety of risk tolerances. Some 
investors may only invest if they believe that approval is all but 
certain; others may be diversified and thus indifferent to risk; still 
others may be risk-seeking. If the company fraudulently inflates its 
chances of approval, then even if the market as a whole is not fooled, 
investors who directly relied on the misstatements may have been 
fraudulently induced to assume a risk they did not intend to assume, 
and should be entitled to recover if they suffer damages when the risk 
materializes.46 
 
 44.  Cox, supra note 13, at 15. 
 45.  Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 811 (2009). 
 46.  See id. at 854. Individuals who allege that their broker violated their duties by 
recommending “unsuitable” securities have a similar argument: The securities may have been 
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This issue has repeatedly arisen in the context of claims brought 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act47 for fraudulent 
misrepresentations in connection with mutual funds. Open-ended 
mutual fund shares are priced based on the market value of the 
securities they hold; thus, so long as their holdings are accurately 
valued, the shares are priced correctly. Nonetheless, in many cases, 
plaintiffs have alleged that funds fraudulently misrepresented their 
investment strategy, choosing high-risk investments over low-risk 
ones. In these cases, investors incurred losses when the strategies 
failed to pay off. Though the shares were priced “correctly” in the 
sense that risk and reward were properly balanced, investors 
nonetheless claimed they had been injured because they had been 
fraudulently induced to assume a greater degree of risk than they 
intended. Currently, courts disagree as to whether damages are 
recoverable under such circumstances.48 
Just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II, the 
district court in In re BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation49 had occasion to 
recognize this distinction between eyeball reliance and fraud on the 
market reliance. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed BP inflated its 
stock price by misrepresenting its safety protocols. Eventually, BP’s 
statements were proved to be false (and investors were harmed) when 
the Deepwater Horizon exploded, sending the company’s stock price 
plummeting. But the market’s reaction to the explosion—i.e., 
disclosure of the inadequacy of BP’s safety precautions—was far 
more extreme than it would have been had BP told the truth before 
the explosion. In other words, the price reaction to the explosion 
included both the market’s revised assessment of the value of BP’s 
safety protocols, and the market’s assessment of harm to the company 
as a result of the explosion.50 Had the truth been disclosed before the 
explosion, there would have likely been a stock price drop, but it 
would have been far less dramatic than it was when 62,000 barrels of 
 
properly priced based on risk versus reward, but they were not appropriate for an investor with 
the plaintiff’s specific risk tolerances. Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for 
Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1493. 
 47.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 2015). 
 48.  Compare In re Charles Schwab Corp. Securities Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
with In re State Street Bank and Trust Co. Fixed Inc. Funds Inv. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 584 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 49.  2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014), aff’d Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938 (5th Cir. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015). 
 50.  Fisch, supra note 45, at 849. 
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oil were gushing into the ocean every day for months on end. The 
difference, essentially, was between an ex ante warning of increased 
risk of an explosion—more likely, but not certain to occur—and the 
ex post materialization of that risk. 
The question before the court in BP was, which damages were 
recoverable by the plaintiffs? Could the plaintiffs recover damages 
associated both with the fraudulently described safety measures and 
their consequence (the explosion)? Or were plaintiffs limited to 
damages associated solely with the misrepresentations concerning 
safety?51 
In the district court’s view—later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit52— 
plaintiffs proceeding under a fraud on the market theory were 
entitled only to damages equal to the amount by which the stock was 
inflated before the explosion. But plaintiffs who had made their own 
risk assessments by directly relying on BP’s misstatements were 
entitled to recover for the “consequential” damages of the explosion, 
because these investors had been fooled into assuming a risk they had 
sought to avoid.53 
The court’s analysis in this regard was unique. First, the court 
implicitly offered a rationale for allowing investors to recover 
damages even when a lie did not impact prices, namely, that investors 
are entitled to set their own risk tolerances, and these judgments are 
worthy of the securities laws’ respect. Second, and perhaps more 
strikingly, the court explicitly held that damages in a Section 10(b) 
action should vary depending on the plaintiffs’ theory of reliance. 
In fact, the proper measure of damages in a Section 10(b) fraud on 
the market case is very uncertain because most Section 10(b) cases 
settle or are dismissed before definitive court determinations are 
made. When the issue arises, courts typically recite that the proper 
measure of damages is the price paid relative to the value received,54 a 
formulation that would seem to exclude damages for the portion of a 
stock price drop solely attributable to the ex post materialization of a 
concealed risk. But plaintiffs typically argue that the value of the 
security should be measured after the risks materialize and the full 
truth is revealed to investors, and courts have at least allowed for the 
 
 51.  BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *82–84. 
 52.  Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938 (5th Cir. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015). 
 53.  See id. at *87–88. 
 54.  Rosado v. China N. E. Petrol. Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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possibility that damages for risk materialization may be appropriate.55 
Several circuits have permitted the element of loss causation to be 
satisfied through risk materialization as well,56 which suggests that 
damages may follow. Thus, although there is extensive academic 
commentary on the subject of the proper measure of fraud on the 
market damages,57 there is little definitive caselaw.58 
From some policy perspectives, the distinction drawn by the BP 
court was sound. Markets only become efficient through active 
trading, i.e., the trades of investors who examine publicly available 
information and make individual investment decisions. “Passive” 
investors, those who rely solely on indices or other broad trading 
strategies, do not trade based on new information and thus contribute 
nothing to market efficiency—they free-ride on the efforts of traders 
who analyze firm-specific information. “Active” investors may 
therefore have the strongest claim to recover damages caused by 
fraud, as many commenters have argued.59 
But in BP, the court did more than simply announce that damages 
would be measured differently for active and passive investors.  
Instead, it denied class certification on the ground that distinguishing 
between the two groups for damages purposes would cause 
individualized issues to predominate over common ones.60 And even 
assuming all investors were passive, the court held that plaintiffs had 
the burden of coming forward with a mechanism for segmenting the 
damages caused solely by the misstatements (the only damages to 
which the class would be entitled) from the consequential damages of 
the explosion, if only to demonstrate that such calculations would not 
 
 55.  Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 728 n.27 (11th Cir. 2012); see 
also Ludlow, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938, at *36. 
 56.  See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 57.  Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in 
Shareholder Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199; Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using 
Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883 
(1990); Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities Litigation, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 717. 
 58.  The problem is made more difficult by the likelihood that the concealment of a fraud 
allows it to worsen and increases the likelihood of larger damages. For example, had BP 
admitted the flaws in its safety protocols, either the market—or regulators—would likely have 
forced the company to fix them before the incident occurred. 
 59.  See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 348; A. C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
217, 237–38. 
 60.  See BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900, at *88–90. 
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require individualized inquiries.61 Because the plaintiffs could not 
satisfy this burden, the class was not certified.62 In other words, the 
court used the distinction between “actual” reliance damages and 
fraud on the market damages as a backdoor mechanism for shifting 
the burden of establishing price impact onto the plaintiffs at class 
certification. 
But it is not clear that BP is consistent with Halliburton II. If 
Halliburton II eliminates eyeball reliance as a basis for a claim, then 
there can be no distinction between eyeball reliance and fraud on the 
market reliance in terms of damages calculations, and the existence—
or not—of eyeball reliance cannot defeat class certification. But this 
puts us back where we started: if individualized reliance does not 
create a viable basis for a claim in the open market context, why is 
price impact appropriate for determination at class certification? And 
if the answer is simply administrative convenience—the expert 
analysis will be before the court anyway—then perhaps BP was 
correct to demand a damages methodology, because that, too, is 
closely related to the price impact dispute that the Supreme Court has 
now authorized for resolution as part of the Rule 23 inquiry. 
V.  HALLIBURTON II’S IMPLICATIONS 
The above analysis may seem like an angels-on-pinheads debate. 
Most investors employ fraud on the market theories when pursuing 
claims for open-market frauds.  Cases are likely few and far between 
where the market remains unmoved by a fraud, and yet an investor—
one with sufficient resources to file a lawsuit—is able to demonstrate 
actual reliance.63 So if there are not likely to be many situations in 
which an investor has a viable claim in the absence of price impact, 
what difference does all of this make? 
 
 61.  The court believed this result was mandated by Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 
S. Ct. 1426 (2013), which overturned a lower courts’ certification order on the ground that 
plaintiffs had failed to establish that there existed a common methodology for determining 
damages across all class members. Most courts, however, have held that, Comcast 
notwithstanding, failure to establish a common damages methodology, standing alone, should 
not defeat class certification. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801–02 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 62.  See BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900, at *90. 
 63.  As described above, see supra note 59, more recent studies suggest that sophisticated 
players cannot consistently correct the pricing mistakes of novices. Moreover, investors with the 
resources and losses to make an individual lawsuit worthwhile are likely to be institutions or 
wealthy individuals with access to expert market analysis. 
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Most obviously, it may make a difference in “opt out” litigation. 
Though investors rarely file open-market Section 10(b) claims on 
their own, there is an increasing tendency for institutional investors to 
opt out of fraud on the market class actions and seek individual 
recoveries.64  These investors continue to press fraud on the market 
theories of reliance, but they may additionally allege “actual” reliance.  
And now that In re BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation has held that 
“actual” reliance claims are more valuable than fraud on the market 
claims, investors have very strong additional incentives both to opt-
out of fraud on the market class actions, and to allege actual reliance. 
Yet if Halliburton II prohibits eyeball reliance allegations, investors 
may be stymied in this attempt. 
But to the extent Halliburton II does imply that eyeball reliance 
claims may not be pursued in efficient markets, its greatest impact is 
likely to be felt in the gap between fact and evidence. There may be 
few cases where in fact investors actually relied on false statements 
that had no price impact, but investors may often find it easier to 
prove actual reliance over price impact. 
For example, as described above, courts have been willing to 
assume that in markets designated as “efficient,” even very obscure 
and piecemeal bits of information offset the impact of much more 
prominent misstatements.65 If courts use artificial rules of thumb to 
“find” the existence of an offset, investors may prefer to simply allege 
actual reliance. This is particularly so given Halliburton II’s apparent 
relaxation of the definition of market efficiency, allowing a greater 
variety of markets to be included in the category. But if Halliburton II 
is taken to mean that actual reliance claims are not viable, even 
investors who are capable of demonstrating actual reliance may be 
left without any remedy at all.66 
 
 64.  Joshua H. Vinik, Why institutional investors are opting out of class-action litigation, 
PENSIONS & INVEST. (July 25, 2009), available at http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/ 
PRINT/307259985/why-institutional-investors-are-opting-out-of-class-action-litigation. 
 65.  See text accompanying notes 22–24. 
 66.  State law may potentially provide more expansive remedies than those that might be 
available under Section 10(b). However, assuming state law would yield a different result (states 
often look to federal law to define common law fraud claims, see, e.g., King Cnty. v. IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 n. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)), even investors 
who claim actual reliance may want to coordinate their lawsuits with any pending federal class 
actions to save on discovery costs. If they do so, under the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (West 2015), they will be forbidden from advancing state law 
claims. Indeed, even investors who do not wish to coordinate with a federal class action may find 
it impossible to advance state law claims so long as a federal class action is pending. See 
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Similar mischief may result from the price impact inquiry 
mandated by Halliburton II at class certification. Theoretically, there 
are only three reasons why a public false statement would not 
influence a security’s price: First, the statement was immaterial in and 
of itself (which courts are not permitted to consider), second, the 
market already knew the truth (which again, per Amgen Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, courts may not consider),67 or third, the 
market was simply not that efficient in the first place (an issue that, by 
hypothesis, has already been resolved in plaintiffs’ favor by the time 
the price impact inquiry arises). Thus, the available tools for 
examining price impact at the class-certification stage are sharply, and 
artificially, circumscribed.68 
The Supreme Court (and, in 1982, Fischel) seized upon “event 
studies”—a type of statistical analysis that is used to identify 
abnormal stock price movements—as a mechanism for identifying 
price impact. But, as multiple scholars have elsewhere explored,69 
event studies are quite limited, and are frequently misunderstood, 
even by courts that employ them.70 For example, if the defendant 
conceals bad news rather than inventing fictional good news, the 
market will assume its existing valuation is correct, and there will be 
no price movement for the event study to detect. If multiple pieces of 
news are released simultaneously, event studies cannot shed light on 
which exerted a pull on the stock’s price because they lack the 
capacity to distinguish multiple causes occurring simultaneously.71 So 
 
Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305 (2015). 
 67.  See Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136684 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 29, 2014). 
 68.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized in Halliburton I, the existence of a price 
drop when the truth is revealed cannot be reliably used to determine whether there was price 
impact at the time of the initial misstatement. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see 
also Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual 
Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183 (2009). 
 69.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble With Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 895, 919–20 (2013); Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: 
Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias (Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. 2015). 
 70.  Fisch, supra note 69, at 919–20. 
 71.  Recent research suggests that some companies intentionally release negative news in a 
manner designed to mask stock price effects. See, e.g., Ed DeHaan et al., Market (In)Attention 
and the Strategic Scheduling and Timing of Earnings Announcements, (Social Science Electronic 
Publishing, Inc. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545966; 
At least some of this behavior is apparently designed to thwart shareholder litigation. See 
Michael Furchtgott & Frank Partnoy, Disclosure Strategies and Shareholder Litigation Risk. , 
(Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585267. 
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a qualitative assessment of market reaction (in addition to event 
studies’ “quantitative” assessment) is often a critical component of 
the price impact inquiry, and yet this is precisely what courts are 
forbidden to examine at class certification. As a result, the 
opportunity for error and confusion is vast,72 which may create further 
scenarios in which individual investors believe their only hope for 
recovery is an “actual” reliance claim.73 
Finally, it is worth noting that although Fischel equated reliance 
with price impact, he also believed price impact would replace the 
materiality inquiry entirely. In his view, information that impacts stock 
price is material by definition; once price impact has been detected, 
any inquiry into materiality is at an end. Yet the judiciary has been 
unwilling to relinquish control over materiality determinations, and in 
Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted a test for materiality 
that makes no reference to price impact at all.74 As a result, courts 
 
 72.  Such confusion was recently demonstrated by the district court in Halliburton itself.  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II, the plaintiffs renewed their class 
certification motion before the district court.  They alleged that certain false statements were 
repeated from July 1999 through mid-2001, and that the truth was gradually revealed in a series 
of corrective disclosures from June 2001 through December 2001.  The district court accepted 
the argument that if the corrective disclosures did not cause a detectable price drop, that itself 
was evidence that the original false statements had not caused any inflation.  Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97464, *31 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015). Even 
accepting this debatable premise, however, the district court was unable to find a way to apply 
it.  The court held that out of the several disclosures alleged, only the final one, issued on 
December 7, 2001, caused Halliburton’s stock price to fall, and issued an order purporting to 
“grant[] in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, only with respect to the alleged 
corrective disclosure of December 7, 2001.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97464, *96 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015).  This, of course, is meaningless; the 
plaintiffs had sought certification of a class of persons who had purchased Halliburton stock 
between July 1999 and December 2001, and the court’s order shed no light on whether this 
motion was granted or denied, or even whether the false statements issued from July 1999 
through mid-2001 were deemed to have impacted Halliburton’s price in a situation where some 
disclosures caused a price drop, and others did not.  In other words, having wandered down the 
garden path of corrective disclosures as evidence of price impact, the court appears to have 
forgotten the reason for its journey. 
 73.  If a court determines that a defendant has “disproved” price impact at class 
certification, an investor advancing an individual claim would presumably not be bound by that 
determination, and could continue to press for a fraud on the market presumption of reliance 
outside the class-action context. However, as a practical matter, individual investors may believe 
that a court, having made a determination of no price impact at class certification, will be 
reluctant to disturb that finding in an individual proceeding.  This, in fact, is exactly what 
occurred in In re Moody’s Corp. Secs. Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122449, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 22, 2013). 
 74.  The Basic test for materiality looks to whether the information “would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information 
made available.” Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
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today frequently base materiality determinations solely on their own 
intuitions as to what a reasonable investor would—or should—
consider when making an investment decision.75 In some cases, courts 
have actively rejected evidence of price impact in favor of their own 
materiality determinations.76 This approach to materiality is 
inconsistent with a requirement that reliance be equated with price 
impact. Either the market is the final arbiter of what an investor 
values, or it is not; otherwise, investors are caught in a “heads I win, 
tails you lose” trap, where price impact may be ignored or required 
precisely as needed to reject a claim. 
VI.  WHITHER CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Ultimately, Halliburton II was an exercise in baby-splitting. The 
Court based its decision not on the existence (or lack thereof) of 
individualized issues, but on its dissatisfaction, procedurally, with 
conducting only half an inquiry into price impact at the class-
certification stage. The Court reasoned that as long as “indirect” 
measures of price impact (efficiency and publicity) were to be 
considered at class certification, it was only fair to consider certain 
“direct” measures as well. 
But the better question might be, why even consider the indirect 
measures? The efficiency inquiry will be revisited by a jury on the 
merits,77 and if the evidence is sufficiently clear one way or the other, 
the matter can be resolved via summary judgment. In other words, the 
question of market efficiency is itself common to the class. So why is 
 
 75.  David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537 
(2006). 
 76.  For example, in Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004), the 
defendant company’s stock price dropped upon disclosure that its CEO had never graduated 
college. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless held that the information was not material in light of his 
other accomplishments. See id. at 658. Similarly, in In re Merck & Co. Securities Litigation, 432 
F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit held that a company’s accounting methodology was 
not material, because the company’s stock price did not react when the method was first 
disclosed in the footnotes to the corporate financial statements. See id. at 269. In so doing, the 
court ignored the fact that the stock price plummeted when the methodology was more 
accessibly publicized in a Wall Street Journal article a few months later. See id. at 265.  Most 
recently, in Police Ret. Sys. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth 
Circuit held that courts should decide whether statements are immaterial “puffery”—incapable 
of being relied upon by rational investors—without considering whether such statements did, in 
fact, impact stock prices.  See id. at 1060.  In other words, the court implicitly concluded that 
statements may be deemed immaterial as a matter of law even in the face of evidence that a 
significant segment of the market actually relied upon them. 
 77.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011). 
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efficiency appropriate for consideration at class certification in the 
first place? 
This problem is actually a specific instance of a broader 
theoretical uncertainty in class-action procedure. Class certification is 
appropriate when the questions raised are “capable of classwide 
resolution,”78 but whether a question is capable of class-wide 
resolution depends on the level of generality at which the question is 
posed.79 The initial question of which questions must be considered is 
not one that can be answered by resort to abstractions, but only via a 
functional analysis of Rule 23’s commonality and predominance 
inquiries. 
The most basic justification for the commonality/predominance 
aspects of Rule 23 is that courts must protect plaintiffs by ensuring 
that they are not bound by a judgment in a proceeding where their 
interests were not represented.80  If class members differ from each 
other, they may benefit from different (or conflicting) forms of relief, 
or factual determinations adverse to the named plaintiffs may not 
fairly apply to the class as a whole. In the Section 10(b) context, for 
example, courts might fear that if the class is improperly certified and 
a jury later determines the market was not efficient, the class may lose 
on the merits, which will then be res judicata even against absent class 
members who may have had viable “eyeball reliance” claims.81 
 
 78.  Id. at 2551. 
 79.  Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97, 131–32 (2009). The case of Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010), is instructive. 
There, the plaintiffs sought class certification on their claims that the City of New York had 
violated their constitutional rights and engaged in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment 
by arresting them under a statute that had been declared unconstitutional years earlier. The 
City argued that individualized determinations would be required regarding the circumstances 
of each arrest; the Second Circuit rejected that argument, on the ground that merely the 
question whether the circumstances of each arrest was relevant was itself a question common to 
the class. See id. at 485–86. 
 80.  See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997); Gen. Tel. Co. of the 
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982). Because Rule 23 is generally viewed as a 
mechanism for protecting absent class members from binding adverse determinations, courts 
frequently note that there is a certain fox-guarding-henhouse quality to allowing defendants to 
challenge certification. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local 130, 657 
F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981); Coffin v. Bowater Inc., 229 F.R.D. 397, 408 n.13 (D. Me. 2005). 
 81.  Another justification is to protect courts from being forced to undertake a variety of 
unwieldy, individualized determinations as a result of an insufficiently cohesive class. But 
market efficiency, or its lack, does not create this kind of risk. If there is a danger that a lack of 
market efficiency will cause the action to devolve into individualized inquiries, that danger 
persists even after a judge makes a preliminary efficiency determination, precisely because the 
jury may revisit the question.  And because all other aspects of the Section 10(b) action—
materiality, falsity, scienter, and the like—are common across class members, there is little risk 
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Yet it is doubtful whether investors need this kind of protection.  
When it comes to securities class actions, there is a well-developed 
“market” for opt-outs. Investors who are capable of opting out (in the 
sense that their losses are large enough to make an individual action 
economically feasible) are likely to be well counseled about the 
benefits and drawbacks of proceeding individually. As a result, it is 
unlikely that any plaintiff will be unfairly bound by an adverse 
judgment. If the question of price impact—including efficiency and 
publicity—is entirely left in jurors’ hands, investors are well 
positioned to decide whether to roll the dice on an unfavorable 
decision. And if a jury finds in the class’s favor and concludes the 
market was efficient, there was, in hindsight, no need for a judge’s 
interference in the first place.82 
The true rationale for requiring an efficiency determination at 
class certification, then, likely lies in a desire to protect defendants, 
rather than plaintiffs. But, at least as a theoretical matter, defendants 
should not need such protection, because they can challenge market 
efficiency and price impact before the fact-finder. Therefore, courts 
could only be protecting defendants against the fact-finder itself—
protection against the risk that the fact-finder (namely, a jury) will 
reach an incorrect determination,83 or, relatedly, the risk that the sheer 
unpredictability of the fact-finder’s determination will lead to 
increased discovery costs and a coerced settlement on a meritless 
claim. 
To the extent courts explicitly articulate their distrust of juries in 
the context of class certification, they typically declare that 
 
of accidentally embroiling a court in a morass of individualized issues that could have been 
avoided but for certification. 
 82.  Moreover, if the court is truly concerned about “binding” absent class members to an 
adverse determination in the absence of market efficiency, there are better solutions than to 
require an efficiency determination at the class-certification stage.  For example, the court could 
try the issue of efficiency first, and either decertify the class if efficiency is lacking, or certify the 
class only as to the remaining elements under Rule 23(c)(4).  Alternatively, the court could 
allow absent plaintiffs to bring their own lawsuits on direct reliance theories in the event of an 
adverse efficiency determination.  It is relatively common for plaintiffs to discard theories of 
recovery that require individualized determinations to allow for class-wide adjudication; when 
they do, courts sometimes (though not always) allow absent class members to take a second bite 
at the apple with individualized claims, so long as they do not seek to re-litigate issues that were 
adjudicated in the class proceeding. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 785–86 (2013). 
 83.  Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlement Pressure, Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1892–94 (2006). 
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certification is improper for an “immature” tort.84 The “immature” tort 
is a set of novel legal and factual claims (usually arising in the context 
of mass torts, such as tobacco) that the court believes are better 
adjudicated on an individual basis so the parties can develop their 
understanding of the claims’ merits and the likelihood of the 
plaintiffs’ success.85 But whatever merits of the immature tort theory,86 
it has no application in the fraud on the market context, where the 
legal and factual bases for the claims are exceedingly well developed. 
As for the notion that class certification puts unwarranted 
settlement pressure on defendants because of the unpredictability of 
the verdict, the extent to which courts may consider the possibility 
under Rule 23 is a matter of some controversy.87 Several courts have 
deemed consideration of “blackmail” settlements to be a legitimate 
part of the class-certification inquiry, and have responded either by 
holding plaintiffs to a high burden of proof in establishing that Rule 
23’s requirements are met,88 or by giving the possibility its own 
independent weight.89 At the same time, however, a preliminary merits 
inquiry would seem to contravene Supreme Court pronouncements 
regarding the proper scope of Rule 23.90 And whatever the status of 
this debate in general, in both Amgen and Halliburton II, the Court 
explicitly rejected the argument that securities class-action procedures 
 
 84.  Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 
1481–82 (2005). 
 85.  See id. 
 86.  Some courts have explicitly rejected the theory. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 
F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 87.  Compare In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), with Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, 
Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969 (2010).  
Significantly, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), and Comcast Corporation 
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)—two of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions tightening 
standards for class certification—the Court made no mention of the need to protect defendants. 
 88.  Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 89.  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 90.  See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). Some courts and commenters have 
recommended that class certification be denied when it results in the creation of liability that 
Congress likely did not anticipate. This is most likely to occur when claims are subject to 
statutory damages; in that context, Congress may not have intended to create the kind of 
massive liability that results from aggregation. If so, the class-action procedure is itself at odds 
with congressional intent. See Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1885–87. This concern, however, only 
applies to certain kinds of statutes, and has no application in the securities context, where 
Congress unquestionably anticipated—and legislated for—class-action remedies. See 
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) (recognizing that Congress enacted the PSLRA to 
shape and reform securities class actions). 
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should be modified to avoid unwarranted settlement pressure on the 
grounds that Congress has already designed a variety of alternative 
screening mechanisms to reduce the possibility of frivolous lawsuits.91 
Thus, if settlement pressures are off the table as part of the Rule 
23 inquiry, the more theoretically sound conclusion may be that not 
only should courts not consider price impact at class certification, but 
also that they should not stand sentry over the efficiency 
determination—at least so long as plaintiffs have enough evidence of 
efficiency to avoid summary judgment. Yet despite the Halliburton II 
Court’s recognition that settlement pressures are not an appropriate 
Rule 23 consideration, it did not dig deeper and connect fraud on the 
market class certification to the underlying purposes of Rule 23. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In Halliburton II, the Court started from the proposition that 
efficiency is suitable for examination at the class-certification stage. 
With that premise in hand, the remaining issues—materiality, price 
impact, and so forth—became matters of line-drawing. And one 
cannot help but suspect that the (purported) ease with which 
plaintiffs obtain class certification in securities cases helped to dictate 
the line the Court drew.92 Unfortunately, this particular line is both 
impractical and theoretically unsound, and will likely lead to 
inconsistencies going forward. 
 
 
 91.  See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1200–01; Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413. 
 92.  Langevoort, Judgment Day, supra note 33, at 46–47. 
